Introduction
Privatisation of stated-owned enterprises (SOEs) gained considerable momentum in developing and developed countries in the 1980s and 1990s (The World Bank, 2006, p. 3) . Despite wide-ranging privatisation programmes, SOEs are still and will be an important part of many economies, especially in developing economies (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999; Ezzamel, Wilmott, & Worthington, 2008; Vagliasindi, 2008; Ennser-Jedenastik, 2013) . According to the United Nations, SOEs in high-income countries constitute an 8% share of GDP and a 13% share of investments (Ernst & Young, 2010) . In the least developed countries, the shares are even higher: 14% and 28%, respectively. In China, for example, the central government controls 17,000 SOEs, and local governments control over 150,000 SOEs. Furthermore, Indian Railways employs 1.6 million people and is one of the world's largest commercial employers.
State-ownership has been criticised due to undue political interference by governments or to passive state ownership (The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 2005, 28).
In many places, state-ownership has led to inefficiency and wasted resources compared to private ownership in competitive environments (Ramamurti, 1991; Vagliasindi, 2008) . It is often stated that state-owned enterprises operate behind a curtain, revealing little information beyond their general mandate. SOEs' objectives are unclear or conflicting, and the lack of transparency can also be traced to political motivations to avoid public comparisons with the private sector (Ramamurti, 1991; OECD, 2005) . In some cases, governments may attempt to reduce their budgets and reported deficits by pushing spending and debts to their SOEs (Papenfuss & Schaefer, 2009, p. 717-718; Blondy et al., 2013, p. 270 ).
On the other hand, through public ownership, the state can sustain sectors of long-term strategic or national security interests that are presently uneconomical for private investments. Natural monopolies are perhaps appropriate to keep in public ownership (OECD, 2005; Vihn Le & Buck, 2011) .
Moreover, governments often find that SOEs are a useful strategy to pursue social goals, such as greater equality and social stability (Ramamurti, 1987; Bozec & Breton, 2003; Austvik, 2012) . However, state ownership may also be motivated by purely financial objectives (Goldeng, Grünfeld, & Benito, 2008; Krivogorsky & Grudnitski, 2010) . There is also variation in the ownership shares from full, 100% ownership to less-than-10% minority ownership (Liu & Sun, 2005; Lopez-de-Foronda, Lopez-Iturriaga, & Santamaria-Mariscal, 2007; Okhmatovskiy, 2010) . When considering these utterly different categories of enterprises, it is crucial to understand what objectives the state-owner may set for such enterprises (Luke, 2010) .
The purpose of this article is not to discuss corporatisation of government activities or privatisation of SOEs but to the heterogeneous field of SOEs. This modelling is performed especially for ownership steering and parliamentary surveillance perspectives.
The research objective is divided into two questions:
1. What objectives do SOEs have and how can we classify different SOEs based on these objectives?
2. How can we form a steering and monitoring model that takes into consideration the different objectives and different types of SOEs? This model is then tested with the case country data.
The theoretical concepts have been derived from the agency theory. The practical concepts of SOE surveillance and steering are inserted into the theoretical model in a way that allows the formulation and implementation of state ownership policies. By using the Finnish state's share portfolio as an example, we create a framework (or model) that emphasises different ownership policies and steering objectives within the heterogeneous SOE context. This framework is crucial to understanding the objectives set for different types of ownership and determining the most critical information, especially from the point-of-view of parliamentary supervision. The framework is suitable for organising and systematising the necessary performance and accountability information of SOEs in developed and developing countries, which have a wide variety of SOEs.
The results help form an outline of the issues that are salient in the pursuit of good SOE governance and ownership steering. The Finnish data is suitable for this study because, as a Nordic welfare country, the state of Finland owns a wide variety of different enterprises. Corporate governance of SOEs in Nordic countries functions well when considered from an international perspective (Frederic, 2011, p. 12-13) Some of the Finnish state's enterprise ownership is based purely on financial interests, some is based solely on strategic interests and some on strategic and financial interests (Parliament of Finland, 2009 ). Moreover, some of these SOEs have corporation charters that make them not-for-profit companies. In addition, the Finnish state shareholdings range from 100% sole ownership to less-than-10% ownership (see Appendix 1). It should be noted that governments in the UK and other western countries have largely divested themselves of such ownership in companies operating on a purely forprofit basis (Jupe, 2012) . Hence, national ownership policies, e.g. in the UK, focus on a much more homogenous group of companies than those in Finland and other Nordic countries.
The findings are interesting, especially in the context of transition economies and developing countries. In these countries, the dimensions of owner steering may, in many respects, be in their infancy, and the variety of their SOEs is significant (Koppel, 2007) . Consistency in the basis, extent and listing status of SOEs as tools for steering and reporting creates good preconditions for ownership policy decision-making and ultimately improves the outcomes of government ownership policy and steering.
Transparency and published motives for ownership policies are important to keep a broad range of stakeholders aligned on the objectives and achievements of ownership policy.
After the introductory section, this article proceeds as follows. In section 2, we present a theoretical framework, and we review the institutional settings in section 3. In section 4, we address the basis for ownership steering and the classification of state-owned enterprises for surveillance, which are then applied to the ownership steering and reporting model in section 5. In section 6, we draw conclusions.
Theoretical Framework The Three-Stage Agency Model
The theoretical framework of this study is based on agency theory, which describes the relationship between two or more parties in which one party, designated as the principal, engages another party, designated as the agent, to perform some tasks on behalf of the principal (Coase, 1937; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989) . Agency theory is concerned with analysing and resolving problems that may occur in the agency-principal relationship. The theory assumes that once principals delegate authority to agents, they often have problems controlling them because the agents' goals often differ from theirs, and agents often have better information about their capacity and activities than principals. Agency theory focuses on the measures principals utilise to mitigate this problem by selecting certain types of agents and certain forms of monitoring their actions as well as by using economic incentives (Kiser, 1999) .
In the present study, the agency theory setup is three-staged; this frame of reference is presented in Figure 1 . The first stage in the agency relationship is between the management and owners of individual SOEs; the second is between a political decision-making body and the central administration responsible for implementing owner steering; and the third is between the political decision-maker and the electorate (Huber, 2000; Muller, 2000) . This multiple-stage reporting relationship is typical for owner steering, particularly in Nordic countries but also in some other OECD countries such as Australia, New Zealand, and the Netherlands (OECD, 2005a) . According to the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises (OECD, 2005a) , the ideal model is a governance structure composed of three distinct layers, each with a distinct role: 1) a state-ownership function that is responsible for defining the ownership policy and high-level objectives for SOEs; 2) a board that is charged by the state with overseeing the development and progress of the chosen strategy to achieve the state's objectives; and 3) an executive-management SOE that proposes a strategy and that is then accountable to the board for implementing the strategic plan.
The most important focus of the study is on the second principal-agent relationship, shown in the central panel of Figure 1 between the political decision-making body and the central administration responsible for implementing ownership steering. In this principal-agent relationship, state administration (the possible ownership steering unit and the relevant ministries) is now in the role of agent and the principal is the political decision-making body, which in the case of Finland is the Parliament and its Audit Committee. The third principal-agent relationship portrays how the political decisionmaker is responsible to its own principal, the electorate. This relation is ultimately expressed in the parliamentary elections.
Direct and Indirect Ownership Steering
In Figure 1 , the left-hand panel presents the first tier of the principal-agent relationship manifested between the management and owners of individual companies. More specifically, the left-hand panel shows that state ownership steering can be either direct or indirect. In direct steering, the individual SOEs (agents) are obligated to report not only to the officials of the state's central government (principal I) representing the state-owner but also to other owners (principal II). Fundamentally, this agent relationship reflects the problems caused by the differentiation of the roles of corporate management, the agent and the owner (the principal) (Berle & Means, 1932; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997) .
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On the other hand, the ownership steering is indirect if the state does not directly own the shares but rather indirectly owns them through a holding company, which then owns shares in other companies (Liu & Sun, 2005) .
1 One reason for establishing a holding company is that it is a fast decision-maker; therefore, it can exploit the stock markets better than a government when a suitable opportunity opens for selling (or buying) shares. The individual SOEs are responsible for reporting to the holding company, but the holding company itself is required to report its operations to the state government. Thus, the state holding company is at the first stage of the agent relationship in both the agent's and the principal's roles. This also complicates the principal-agency relations and, ultimately, owner steering.
Principal-agency Problems
Conflicting objectives, political interference and a lack of public transparency are considered the main problems for SOEs. A crucial problem for the entire principal-agency chain is a situation in which the principal, i.e. the state, has no consistent and transparent ownership policy with identifiable objectives. The goals of public enterprises may be difficult to specify due to the problems of multiple objectives (commercial versus non-commercial) as well as plural principals and agents (Jones, 1991, p. 181 Agency problems emerge when politicians and bureaucrats as agents tend to harness their private or narrow group interests and do not carry out their work in accordance with the interests of society as the ultimate principal. For instance, politicians may force companies to perform unprofitable activities in their electoral district in order for the politician to be re-elected in the next election (Kamal, 2010, p. 214) . On the other hand, SOEs' management may challenge the legacy of their nonfinancial obligations set by politicians-for example, by supporting unrelated industries through indirect subsidies such as products, services or financing offered at below-market rates (Budiman et al., 2009 (Frederick, 2011; Latin American Development Bank, 2012) .
One solution to alleviate public principal-agency problems is total privatisation, which detaches the government from the ownership role but, on the other hand, preserves the role of the government as a regulator of markets and corporations acting on the markets. Another solution is to remain an owner but, at the same time, develop an incentive system as the agency theory suggests. A good incentive system can steer and motivate managers to manage their enterprises efficiently and act in the interest of society as a whole. Jones (1991) uses the concept of a signalling system that has three components.
The first is a performance evaluation system, in which national goals are translated into enterprise objectives and quantified in a performance criterion. The second is a performance information system that monitors actual achievements. The third is an incentive system, in which the welfare of managers and workers are linked to national welfare by pecuniary or non-pecuniary bonus systems based on the achievement of target values. Governments can also make contracts with SOE boards and managements about the performance expected from the SOE in question (Jones, 1991, p. 180; Vagliasindi, 2008, p. 18-19; The World Bank, 2006, p. 16-17) . However, in this paper we concentrate more on the government as an owner of enterprises and on the accountability relationship, especially to the political body, and less on the incentive and performance management systems of SOEs.
The reporting lines in our model ( Figure 1 ) show the accountability relations from the agents to the principals at the same time. Accountability for the performance of SOEs involves a complex chain of agents without clearly identifiable, i.e. remote, principals. This chain of agents can include management, enterprise management boards and in two-tier enterprise board structures also supervisory boards above management boards, ownership steering entities, ministries and governments. According to the OECD, it is a challenge to structure this web of accountabilities in order to ensure efficient decisions and good corporate governance (OECD, 2005a, p. 10) . Modelling of accountability relations can be used to identify and mitigate principal-agent conflicts (Luke, 2010, p. 138) .
As shown in Figure 1 , on one hand the administration responsible for owner steering serves as a principal under which individual enterprises operate. On the other hand, the state government is obliged to report to its own principal about whether owner steering and owner policies have been implemented according to the approved political objectives. Thus, it is important that high-quality monitoring information is systematically reported not only to relevant state administrations but also to Parliament.
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE The emphasis on ownership interest in SOEs affects the performance goals that are set for SOEs. In a consistent model of ownership policy, this should be the first thing the state does; after this, the state can determine which ownership structure will facilitate the achievement of defined goals. There are three important options in regard to SOE ownership structure: concentrated ownership, in which a state owns 100% of the shares; shared ownership with the state as the majority owner; and shared ownership with the state as the minority owner. The shares can be made publicly available by listing shares in local and international capital markets, which makes widely dispersed ownership possible.
Furthermore, the enterprise may be non-listed and owned completely by the state or by a combination of public and private investors.
There are three main types of organisations of steering functions. The first is the decentralised (sector) model, in which SOEs are under the responsibility of several relevant sector ministries. In the dual model, the responsibility is shared between the sector ministry and the Finance Ministry or the Treasury. In the centralised model, the ownership function is concentrated in one main ministry or one special ownership agency under the government (OECD, 2005b, p. 41-49; Vagliasindi, 2008, p. 9-13; The World Bank, 2006, p. 11-13) .
The disadvantages of the decentralised model are that it may mix the ownership function with the regulatory role in a sector ministry easier than the other models might, and it may lead to more interferences in SOE operating decisions compared to the other two models (OECD, 2005b, p. 45; Vagliasindi, 2008, p. 13-14) OSD is responsible for steering the holding company as well as the commercial companies with strategic interests. These may be listed (such as Neste Oil and Fortum, which are leading oil and energy companies in Finland) or non-listed. Enterprises with social and public policy objectives are nonlisted and are owned directly, and they are under the steering responsibility of sector ministries. In section 5, we elaborate on the classification of SOEs in Finland according to three dimensions: type of main owner interest, listed or non-listed enterprises and extent of state ownership of shares.
According to Vagliasindi (2008, p. 11) , the main advantage of a holding company solution is that it can be used to facilitate nationwide programs for the privatisation and restructuring of state-owned industry. The disadvantage is that a holding company doesn't change the possible poor corporate governance in the country. It requires its own specific programs for developing corporate governance for SOEs.
The case of Finland shows that a holding company can also be used to buy shares of industrially important companies. The Finnish government added its ownership of an existing telecommunication company and of a new mining company at the end of the 2000s and in the beginning of the 2010s. Cell B 1, which shows enterprises with strategic commercial value for government, is even more problematic because in this cell, the state is only a minority owner and the ownership is indirect through a holding company
The three main multi-agency chain alternatives that mediate the ownership policy lines to implementation in a parliamentary democracy and report to the principal of the ownership policy can be drawn as follows. In Parliament, there may be a special audit committee or economy committee that prepares SOE matters for plenary sessions. This special committee may have the right to audit SOE matters and arrange public or secret hearings of agents responsible in the multi-agency chain. Furthermore, the parliament may obtain independent evaluation information from the supreme audit institution in the country regarding the implementation of the ownership policy. In the next section, we shed more light on the ownership policy in the case country Finland as we implement our classification model for Finnish SOEs.
Institutional Case Environment
The Finnish history of state industrial policy extends back to the first decades after independence in 1917 (Hyytinen, Kuosa, & Takalo, 2003) . During the years before and after the Second World War, there was a lack of capital to support important heavy industries, such as the energy, metal, wood, and paper industries. Because of this, the state took the initiative and established state-owned companies in these fields. This historical background explains the wide array of Finnish state ownership in the heavy industries (Moen & Lilja, 2005; Ornston, 2012) .
Beginning in the late 1980s, the New Public Management (NPM) movement, which aimed to reform hierarchically operating public administrations in a more flexible managerial direction and to apply market models, had an influence in Finland (Hood, 1996; Temmes, 1998 : Green-Peders, 2002 Therefore, the government of Finland cannot directly nominate or dismiss board members or CEOs because these actions belong to the owners in the general meeting or to the board of the company.
Special assignment companies must follow a separate law that has been enacted especially for the 
Classification Basis for State-Owned Enterprises
In the SOE literature, the basic demarcation line has been drawn between enterprises with commercial goals and those that also have non-commercial goals. For instance, in Indonesia, there are two types of SOEs: general companies that have social purposes and limited liability companies that are business-oriented SOEs (Kamal, 2010 Bank, 2012, p. 20-21) .
In this paper, we use a basic classification in which SOEs are divided according to the type of owner's interest: non-commercial enterprises (special state assignment enterprises), commercial enterprises with pure commercial shareholder interest and commercial enterprises with strategic value for the government. A division into two classes is too crude, and the above-mentioned division into four classes unnecessarily mixes the type of owner's interest with the type of produced goods.
Division According to Basis of Ownership
Through public ownership, the state can sustain sectors of long-term strategic or national security interests that are presently uneconomical for private investment (Luke, 2010) . In addition, governments often find SOEs to be a useful strategy for pursuing social goals, such as greater equality and social stability (Ramamurti, 1987; Bozec & Breton, 2003; Austvik, 2012) . In Finland, the owner interests of the state of Finland fall into three groups: economic, strategic and special state assignment (Finnish Council of State, 2007 .
The tasks of special state assignment enterprises are generally provided for in the legislations of various countries, and they determine the state ownership policy and how state steering is carried out (Luke, 2010) . In special state assignments, the objectives of state ownership are primarily societal, albeit with the general aim that the operations should be cost-effective (Finnish Council of State, 2007 State, , 2011 . The sector ministries in charge are responsible for steering special state assignment enterprises.
In Finland the corporate charter is a crucial tool in state ownership steering of special state assignment companies. In the corporate charter, the state defines the societal goals as well as the social and environmental responsibilities that the company must advance; it must comply with these goals even if they are in conflict with business or economic goals. However, the business strategy of a special state assignment company must not jeopardise the societal goals laid down by management and administrative bodies (OECD, 2005a) .
Enterprises with economic and strategic interests (commercial companies) operate under market conditions. Market conditions are the operating principles, funding structure and target proceeds in enterprises owned by the state that can be compared with other enterprises operating in the same fields; the aim is to achieve an optimal economic profit (Vuoria, 2004 to maintaining and ensuring infrastructure or to basic services, but some of them are involved in purely market-based business. Moreover, some SOEs with economic and strategic interests are publicly listed, but some are not. Thus, it appears that the category 'enterprises with economic and strategic interests' is too general, especially for parliamentary monitoring purposes.
Division According to the Extent of Ownership
State ownership shares vary from full 100% ownership to less-than-10% minority ownership (Liu & Sun, 2005; Okhmatovskiy, 2010) . State majority-owned companies are those in which the state holds more than 50% but less than 100% of the votes. If the state owns 100% of the share capital, this is a 'company with sole state ownership'. Then the sole owner, the state, is free to set objectives (other than economic ones) without endangering the positions of other owners or infringing on their rights.
In Finland, a 'state associated company' refers to an enterprise in which the state holds at least 10%, but not more than 50%, of all the voting shares. It is important to note that the advent of a single minority shareholder changes the nature of the company, especially in the operations of publicly listed SOEs because then enterprises are obligated to ensure equal treatment of all shareholders in all their actions (Liu & Sun, 2005) .
Division According to Stock Exchange Listing
Decisive steps regarding market direction and market conditions (excluding the owner's non-market modes of operation or demands) are taken when the enterprise is listed on the Stock Exchange (OECD, 2005a; Goldeng, Grünfeld, & Benito, 2008) . Special assignments of social services are excluded in publicly listed companies in the Stock Exchange, unless these assignments are accepted by the investors and owners in the markets.
At the beginning of May 2013, the Finnish state was a majority owner in three strategically important listed companies (see Appendix 1 and Category IV B). In addition, the state has a considerable minority shareholding in 11 associated companies (Appendix 1, Category V C Figure 1 ).
Social Service Assignment and Shareholder Value Interest
As noted in the previous section, the state can sustain sectors of long-term strategic interests such as national security through public ownership, but the state may also be motivated by purely financial objectives. Based on the division according to the basis of ownership, we divided ownership steering purposes regarding SOEs into the social service assignment principle and the shareholder value creation principle.
The social service assignment principle refers to how effectively the company promotes its social goals and fulfils its special service assignment set by Parliament and the ministries or the Prime Minister's Office. The shareholder value creation principle refers to how profitable and competitive the company is in relation to its competitors in the same industry, i.e. how effectively it creates shareholder value. Some companies in the state portfolio are more oriented toward social service assignment, while others are oriented toward pure shareholder value creation.
Classification of Finnish SOEs for Steering and Reporting
The two-class SOE classification system according to basis of ownership ('special state assignment'
and 'enterprises with economic and strategic interests') by the Finnish Council of State is too general for parliamentary monitoring purposes. A system is needed that further clarifies the nature of state ownership (Parliament of Finland, 1/2009). While some SOEs with economic and strategic interests are also linked to the state's strategic interests, others are involved in purely market-based business.
In addition, some SOEs with economic and strategic interests are publicly listed, but some are not. We also divided the companies in each of the five categories (I-V) into three sub-categories (A, B and C) according to the extent of state ownership. The three sub-categories are as follows:
A. Companies with sole state ownership (100% of the votes);
B. State-majority-owned companies (more than 50%, but less than 100%, of the votes); and C. State-associated companies (more than 10%, but less than 50%, of the votes).
In Figure 3 , the state's ownership of companies is grouped into five categories (I-V) according to how much the state as an owner is focused on the social service assignment principle (the white area in Figure 2 ) or purely shareholder value interests (the grey area in Figure 3) . The greater the share of the white column (and the smaller the grey one), the more state ownership steering of SOEs is focused on the social service assignment. Similarly, the greater the share of the grey column (and the smaller the white one), the more SOEs are focused on creating shareholder value. This system also provides a basis for structuring an information and communication system in which the goals are defined and performance is discussed and modified between the principals and agents.
The five categories (I-V) and three sub-groups (A, B and C) of individual SOEs in the Finnish state portfolio are listed in Appendix 1.
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On the left of Figure 3 , category I A includes the 100% state-owned special state assignment companies. The state-ownership steering in these companies is strongly oriented toward social service assignment (thus the white area is long), although the general goal of profitable operations applies as well (as shown by the short grey area). On the other hand, category V C on the right of Figure 2 displays listed companies in which the state is a minority shareholder and has pure shareholder value interests without social service assignment. Thus, category V C is completely grey.
It is important to note that the advent of a single minority shareholder (sub-groups B and C) changes the nature of the company. Then, the decision-making of the company and the ownership steering must be arranged with due respect for equal treatment of shareholders. This restriction has been ren- The novelty of our model is not only the more subtle classification tool created but also that the agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1979; Eisenhardt 1989 ) used in conjunction with our model creates a template for testing hypotheses with further research. For instance, in line with Vagliasindi (2008), we anticipate that the longer the principal-agency chain (i.e. the more levels in the chain), the more the chain will contain dual and parallel roles for principals and agents. In addition, the more the principal is politically disharmonious, the higher the probability of biased, contradictory, delayed and/or misinterpreted steering signalling from principals to the ultimate agents (SOEs). If the principal, i.e. the ruling cabinet in the country, cannot politically agree on the ownership policy content and is unable to consistently classify SOEs according to their ownership interests and goals, the probability of inconsistent steering signalling will be very high. This is related to the problem of common agency (see the theoretical framework, p. 5-6.)
One tentative example is the case of the icebreaking company Arctic Shipping Ltd., which is fully owned by the Finnish government and is under the steering competence of ODS. It is a commercial company with a strategic value (category II in Figure 3 ) because of the importance of keeping shipping routes open in the Baltic Sea during the winter. During the summer, the multipurpose icebreakers are hired in the offshore oil and gas fields, most recently for the Shell Company's oil-drilling activities in Arctic waters. This business is exercised by the subsidiary Arctia Offshore Ltd., which is fully owned by the parent company Arctia Shipping Ltd. The steering chain is very long and contains dual and partially parallel principals and agents. After the 2011 parliamentary elections, an internally disconnected, multiparty Cabinet came into power, led by Prime Minister Katainen. Therefore, it is likely that conflicts will occur in the chain.
In 2013, these conflicts became apparent. Arctia and the minister for state ownership steering, the Green League's Heidi Hautala, were at the centre of a scandal that emerged when the minister indirectly intervened to protect Greenpeace activists who boarded Arctia vessels in protest of the Shell deal. The OSD's interference with the Arctia Offshore Ltd.'s decision-making, along with the minister's contribution, was considered by the media and the most powerful Cabinet party (the moderateright party Kokoomus) to be inappropriate. Hautala resigned from her post on October 11, 2013.
During the conflict, different interpretations were expressed on whether it was appropriate for the fully state-owned icebreaking company with a strategic interest in Baltic Sea to form a leasing business via its subsidiary company with Shell Oil in Arctic waters. Some criticised this as against government environmental policy because of the heavy risks involved in drilling oil in Arctic waters, while others argued that the Finnish special expertise regarding icebreaking and offshore services should be utilised commercially.
Arctic Shipping, which has a monopoly in the Finnish market, charges higher fees than comparable Swedish companies. This raised suspicions in the Transport Ministry that earnings from ordinary operations were supporting riskier offshore ventures during the summer months. The risk comes from any spills that might occur. If Arctia has to pay to clean up oil spills, its own assets are on the line; however, a report by the Research Institute for the Finnish Economy (ETLA) in 2012 stated that the government, as a 100% owner, could also be liable. In 2010, Arctia was warned by the Transport and Communications Ministry about its risk management policies. The ministry was particularly dissatisfied with risk management in Arctia's offshore agreements (Yle News, 2013.) To maintain the steering mechanism's viability, the commercial activity of the offshore business could have been separated from the government steering chain by privatising the commercial company and its risks. In addition, if the strategic icebreaking service as a monopoly is not functioning satisfactorily from the principal's point-of-view, it could be transferred nearer to the principal and its representative, the Finnish Transport Agency. It could ultimately be changed from an SOE to a public utility under the jurisdiction of the Finnish Transport Agency.
Reporting Priorities for Parliamentary Monitoring Purposes
Transparency requires simultaneously reporting information to all shareholders in order to ensure equitable treatment (OECD, 2005a, pp. 34, 38-39) . According to the OECD recommendations, the coordinating or ownership entity should ensure that adequate external reporting systems are in place for all SOEs (OECD, 2005a, p. 30) . Coordinating or centralised ownership entities should develop aggregate reporting that covers all SOEs and make the reports a key disclosure tool directed to the general public, the Parliament and the media (OECD, 2005a, p. 41) Non-commercial objectives are particularly troublesome because they are typically difficult to quantify in money terms. It is not easy to measure the achievements of non-commercial objectives and incorporate them into the performance evaluation and reporting system. If it is not possible to quantify performance, non-commercial outcomes should be evaluated in qualitative terms and entered into the system of performance indicators. When the costs are quantifiable, the enterprise in question can be compensated by an amount that covers the incremental costs of meeting non-commercial objectives (Jones, 1991, pp. 186, 195-205) . According to the OECD, when the SOE is also used for public policy objectives, such as general services obligations, it should also report on how these are being achieved (OECD, 2005a, p. 44) .
In this article, we limit detailed technical discussion of the best practices for financial reporting by governments and SOEs. Financial reporting for listed and large non-listed SOEs should comply with international standards (The World Bank, 2006, p. 20-21) . Accounting methods should be based on accrual-based accounting, which allows for a full balance sheet showing the full scope of assets and liabilit ies of the government as well of the SOEs. Tradit ionally, central governments' financial reports have been tied to the budget entities of the government, which might have hidden spending and debts transferred to SOEs and other off-budget entities. Modern accounting principles require companies to consolidate accounts for all the entities they control. This principle, when adapted to the public sector, means that governments should also provide consolidated financial statements that include government-controlled SOEs. At the moment, few governments consolidate SOEs in their financial statements (Blondy et al., 2013 (Blondy et al., , p. 267-2719 . SOEs should also report non-financial information, including related party transactions (especially with other SOEs), changes in board membership and high-level executives and changes in ownership structure. Performance indicators related to SOE objectives could also be reported to the public as well as information regarding commercial and noncommercial policy objectives, estimates of the latter's cost and financial assistance from the state (The World Bank, 2006, p. 20-21) . SOEs should also have a heightened sensitivity to corporate social responsibility reporting (Frederic, 2011, p. 22) .
The SOE classification in Figure 3 systematises the information needed for parliamentary monitoring.
The more the SOEs are situated toward the left in Figure 2 , the more the state as an owner has interests other than pure shareholder value and the more Parliament requires surveillance information on how well the company fulfils its social service assignment. The focus for special state assignment companies (the companies in category I) is on the steering perspective set by the ministry in charge. The general goal is that operations are profitable, but the monitoring information stresses quantifying and assessing the companies' social service assignments.
The focus in category II-V SOEs is primarily on economic principles, and strategic interests should be reconciled with these. The aim is that the companies' profitability and financial structures should be at least as good as those of domestic and international competitors. Regarding profitability, good parameters are, among others, the earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) describing the structure of the result, the return on equity (ROE), and the return on assets (ROA). For the analysis of financial structure, the appropriate measures include debt-to-equity and gearing (see e.g. Revsine et al., 2005; Stolowy & Lebas, 2006) . In the Stock-Exchange-listed SOEs in categories IV and V, the analysis can be supplemented with figures based on market information. Among others, the main information to be reported is the development of market value and its relation to the general development of the shares, the yield of the portfolio in relation to the average market yield and the amount of dividends received by the state (Shareholder Executive, 2009) .
If the solution is not to have only one aggregate performance report for the parliament containing performance information from all SOEs, an alternative solution is to have one report on commercial SOEs prepared by the coordinating ownership agency and separate reports prepared by sector ministries responsible for special state assignment enterprises with social and public policy goals for the parliament. The important factor here is that the principal, i.e. the parliament, can receive complete information on how the ownership policy steering and implementation has been performed. Reporting should cover all categories of SOEs if performance reporting and monitoring is to be consistent and comprehensive for parliamentary surveillance purposes.
Summary and Conclusions
This study aimed to create a basis for a general model that is able to systematically categorise state ownership policy and steering. The theoretical concepts were derived from the agency theory, and the practical concept of steering was then inserted into the theoretical model in a way that serves state ownership policy and steering of SOEs (Figure 1 ). In Figure 2 , we showed four different dimensions (type of main owner interest, listed or non-listed enterprises, concentration of steering function and extent of state ownership of shares) connected to methods for appropriately organising groups of SOEs, their accountability and steering system. We outlined three main multi-agency chains that, in a parliamentary democracy, mediate the ownership policy lines to implementation by the accountable agents.
In Figure 3 , we constructed a model that appropriately categorises the state ownership policy of stateowned companies for accountability and steering purposes. Based on the heterogeneous field of the We need a consistent model for designing and monitoring the implementation of ownership policy not only for parliamentary surveillance purposes but also because the government is accountable for the general public, voters and taxpayers. Each government should publish, either online or via other accessible media, its ownership policy lines and how it categorises its SOEs into the different classes outlined in this paper.
The theoretical contribution of the paper is that it elaborates on the most commonly used simple division of SOEs to commercial and non-commercial enterprises. The novelty of this study comes One limitation of the study is that we theorised a framework (model) that was tested with only one case country, even though it was a good fit for the testing purposes. Another limitation is related to the outline of this paper. We used the model mainly for classification purposes, even though the model and its bases (agency theory) create possibilities for testing assumptions connected to the principal-agency chain characteristics (causes) and ownership policy and steering outcomes (effects Organization of steering: 1) a government ownership steering agency/coordinating ministry, 2) decentralized to sector ministries, or a 3) dual model 
